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The total fertility rate is well below its replacement level of 2.1 children in high- income 
countries. Why do women choose such low fertility levels? We study how labor market 
frictions affect the fertility of college-educated women. We focus on two frictions: 
uncertainty created by dual labor markets (the coexistence of jobs with temporary and 
open-ended contracts) and inflexibility of work schedules. Using rich administrative 
data from the Spanish Social Security records, we show that women are less likely to be 
promoted to permanent jobs than men. Temporary contracts are also associated with a 
lower probability of first birth. With Time Use data, we also show that women with children 
are less likely to work in jobs with split-shift schedules, which come with a fixed time cost. 
We then build a life-cycle model in which married women decide whether to work or not, 
how many children to have, and when to have them. In the model, women face a trade-
off between having children early and waiting and building their careers. We show that 
reforms that reduce the labor market duality and eliminate split-shift schedules increase the 
completed fertility of college-educated from 1.52 to 1.88. These reforms enable women 
to have more children and have them early in their life-cycle. They also increase the labor 
force participation of women and eliminate the employment gap between mothers and 
non-mothers. 
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1 Introduction
The total fertility rates (TFR) have been falling everywhere in the world. Today the TFR
is 1.8 in the US, 1.6 in Germany, and 1.4 in Japan; well below the replacement rate of
2.1 children per woman.1 The TFR in some European countries, such as Greece, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain, is even lower. It is around 1.3 children, a situation that demographers
call lowest-low fertility (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002).
The low fertility rates are closely associated with delayed transition into motherhood.
The mean age at rst birth is 32 in Italy and Spain (the highest among the European
countries) and 31 in Greece and Portugal. With delays in rst births, the interval in which
women can have children narrows. As a result, fertility delays lower the number of children
women can have, even if they wanted to have more. Indeed, the desired number of children
is close to 2 in Italy and Spain, even among young, between ages 15 and 39, women.
Population aging, low fertility coupled with higher life expectancy, has been associated
with a host of economic woes: low interest rates, low economic growth, and growing decits
of social security systems around the world (see, among others, De Nardi, ·Imrohoro¼glu and
Sargent 1999; Krueger and Ludwig 2007; Aksoy, Basso, Smith, and Grasl 2019, and Jones
2019). Hence, it is essential to understand why women choose such low fertility rates and
whether and how public policy can a¤ect their decisions.
An extensive empirical literature points to economic uncertainty as a potential culprit.
The emerging consensus from this literature is that factors that restrict womens ability
to start and establish stable labor market careers result in delayed, and as a result, lower
fertility. High unemployment is associated with low fertility, both across and within countries
(Adsera 2011, Ahn and Mira 2001 and Currie and Schwandt 2014). Del Bono, Weber and
Winter-Ebmer (2012, 2015) exploit plant closings in Austria to show that job displacement
reduces fertility, and the most a¤ected women are the ones with career concerns.2
In many European countries, dual labor markets contribute signicantly to economic
uncertainty for women in their childbearing years. In a dual labor market, young workers
hold temporary jobs that can last up to a couple of years, and move from one temporary job
to another until they settle on an open-ended (permanent) contract. Fertility is negatively
associated with the fraction of women who work with a temporary job across countries
(Figure 1). Micro evidence from di¤erent countries also shows that temporary jobs reduce
fertility (see De La Rica and Iza 2005 for Spain, Auer and Danzer 2016 for Germany, Landaud
2019 for France, and Lopes 2019 for Portugal).
1OECD Family Database, Tables SF2.1.A, SF2.3.B, SF2.2.A, http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm.
2Wars, which are marked by heightened economic uncertainty, also lead to postponement of fertility
(Vandenbroucke 2014, Chabe-Ferret and Gobbi 2018). Indeed, during the last two recessions in the US,
fertility started to fall several quarters before economic downturns (Buckles, Hungerman, and Lugauer 2019).
Coskun and Dalgic (2019) show that procyclical fertility can be explained by cyclical properties of di¤erent
industries in which men and women specialize.
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Figure 1. Temporary Contracts and the TFR
Source: OECD Employment Database, https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TEMP_I&lang=en
(accessed on 04/02/2019), and OECD Family Database, Table SF2.1
http://www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm (accessed on 04/02/2019).
Another factor behind low fertility can be the di¢ culty of women to combine work with
childbearing. Following Goldin (2014), there is a growing focus on labor market inexibility,
measured as requirements to work long and particular hours, and its impact on female
labor supply and the gender-wage gap. Occupations with long working hours are associated
with higher gender wage and employment gaps (Cortes and Pan 2016, 2017). Cubas, Juhn
and Silos (2019) also show that the gender-wage gaps are higher in occupations that require
coordinated working hours, measured by bunching of working hours in particular hours of the
day. Evidence from surveys and experiments suggest that women have a stronger preference
for greater work exibility and job stability (Mas and Pallais 2017, Wiswall and Zafar 2018).
One way women can cope with inexible labor market arrangements is to have fewer
children. Figure 2 shows that across the OECD countries, higher exibility is associated with
higher fertility. The TFR is lower in countries where a larger fraction of women indicate that
their working hours are entirely set by their company (left panel). In contrast, it is higher in
countries where a larger fraction of women can adjust (partly or fully) their working hours
(right panel). Along these lines, Billari, Giuntella and Stella (2019) document that access
to high-speed internet in Germany had a positive e¤ect on the fertility of highly-educated
women by increasing the share of them who work from home or part-time.
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Figure 2. Flexibility and the TFR
Source: OECD Family Database, Tables LMF2.4 Family-friendly workplace practices and
SF2.1 Fertility rates, http://www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm (accessed on 04/02/2019)
In this paper, we study how labor market uncertainty and inexibility a¤ect the fertility
behavior of college-educated women in Spain. Several factors make Spain an ideal case
to study the lowest-low fertility. First, a striking feature of fertility in Spain is the very
low fertility rate of college-educated women. Figure 3 shows the TFR by the educational
attainment in Spain and Europe.3 Spains TFR for women with less than a college education
is comparable to other countries (around 1.8). The TFR for college-educated women, on the
other hand, is much lower. Women with a college degree have about one child in Spain,
while they have around 1.5 children in other European countries.
3In Figure 3, the 1997 International Standard Classication of Education (ISCED) codes 0-2 cover edu-
cational attainments up to lower secondary education, 3-4 up to tertiary education, and 5-6 up to the second
stage of tertiary education. The average number for Europe is based on 14 countries with available data.
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Figure 3. TFR by Education, Spain vs. Europe
Source: Lanzieri (2013, Table 6)
Second, Spain has one of the highest fraction of workers with temporary contracts in
Europe (Figure 1). The temporary contracts, which have low ring costs, can last between
6 months to 3 years with compulsory conversion to a permanent contract, which has a
much higher ring cost.4 In practice, temporary contracts are often much shorter, and the
conversion rate of temporary contracts to permanent ones is very low, about 6% per year.5
As a result, a large fraction of the labor force faces very uncertain labor market prospects
as they move from one temporary job to the next one.
Finally, the organization of workday in Spain unusual. Many jobs have long lunch breaks
that create split-shift work schedules. Figure 4 shows the fraction of employees who are at
work during di¤erent times of the day in Norway, Spain, and the UK.6 By 6.00pm, less than
20% of workers are at work in Norway and the UK. In contrast, 50% of them are still at
work in Spain. The split-shift schedules, which make combining work and childcare di¢ cult,
present a concrete example of inexible work arrangements for women.7
4Workers with permanent contracts are entitled to severance pay of 20 dayswages per year of service
(up to a maximum of 12 monthswages) in fair dismissals and 45 days(up to a maximum of 42 months)
wages in unfair dismissals. Firing costs for temporary employees is only 12 dayswages per year of service.
5For a quantitative analysis of dual labor markets in Spain during the Great Recession, see Bentolila,
Cahuc, Dolado and Le Barbanchon (2012).
6The sample is restricted to 25-54 years old employees who lled the diary on an ordinary working day.
The gure shows the fraction who reports employment as the main activity (main or second job and activities
related to employment) at di¤erent hours of the day. The vertical lines mark 9am and 6pm.
7Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2009) nd that most women are constrained in their work schedules,
and do not nd any evidence of a compensating wage di¤erential for having a split-shift schedule.
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Figure 4. Fraction of People at Work
Source: Harmonised European Time Use Surveys (HETUS) database, www.tus.scb.se (accessed on 8/11/2018).
We rst use administrative data from the Spanish Social Security Records, Muestra
Continua de Vidas Laborales con Datos Fiscales (Continuous Sample of Working Lives),
and study the relationship between temporary contracts and fertility.8 We show that even
after controlling for observables, women are 28% less likely than men to be promoted from a
temporary to a permanent job. We also show that temporary jobs are associated with lower
fertility. A woman who spends 50% or more of her working life with a temporary contract
has 1.27 children at age 44, while the same number for a woman who spends less than 50%
of her working life with a temporary contract is 1.53. Finally, using data from the Spanish
Time Use Survey, we show that, after controlling for observables, women with children are
about 57% less likely to work in jobs with split-shift schedules compared to men or women
without children.
We then build a life-cycle model in which married women decide whether or not to
participate in the labor market, how many children to have, and when to have them. They
also make standard life-cycle decisions on consumption and savings. Women di¤er in their
ability level, which is a permanent characteristic that a¤ects their earnings. Each woman
is matched with a husband. Husbands also di¤er in their ability levels. There is a positive
correlation between the ability levels of husbands and wives. Government taxes households
and provide unemployment insurance and means-tested transfers.
All jobs start as temporary, with a high separation rate, and are stochastically promoted
to permanent ones, which have lower separation rates. Jobs can also have a regular or
8Among recent papers that Spanish Social Security data, see De la Roca and Puga (2017), Bonhomme
and Hospido (2017) and García-Pérez, Marinescu and Vall (2019).
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split-shift schedule. A split-shift schedule implies an additional xed time cost of work for
women, which captures the di¢ culties of balancing family and work. Having a child is costly
for parents, both in terms of time and money. Each period, women can be in one of three
employment states: employed, unemployed, or out of the labor force. Only unemployed
women get job o¤ers and decide whether to accept them and work, or stay unemployed, or
leave the labor market. Similarly, each period employed agents might lose their jobs and
decide whether to stay unemployed or leave the labor force. Women who are not in the
labor force choose each period whether to enter and start looking for a new job. As women
work, they accumulate human capital, and the accumulation is faster for younger women.
On the other hand, womens ability to have children declines by age. As a result, women
face a trade-o¤ between establishing their career (having more labor market experience and
obtaining a permanent contract) and risking not having any children.
We use the model to quantify how labor market uncertainty and inexibility a¤ect fertil-
ity. To this end, we compare fertility in the benchmark economy with counterfactual worlds
in which temporary jobs last longer or split-shift schedules are eliminated. These experi-
ments reect the academic and public debate on labor market reforms in Spain closely.9 In
the benchmark economy, temporary contracts last 9 quarters (little over 2 years). When
temporary contracts last 12 quarters (3 years), employed mothers at age 44 have about 0.2
more children (1.67 vs. 1.44). Elimination of split-shift schedules has a larger impact on
fertility; the number of children of employed mothers at age 44 increases from 1.44 to 1.75.
When we combine these two reforms, i.e., lower the separation rates of temporary jobs and
eliminate split-shift schedules, employed mothers at age 44 have 1.95 children. The average
completed fertility rate for college-educated women in this alternative world is 1.88; close to
Denmark and Sweden that have the highest TFR among highly-educated women in Europe
(Lanzieri 2013). In the alternative economy with lower uncertainty and inexibility, the
higher fertility comes together with higher, not lower, labor force participation of women.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the structural labor and macro litera-
tures that study the labor force participation and fertility decisions of women.10 Within this
literature, Sommer (2016) emphasizes the importance of income uncertainty (wage shocks)
9In 2009, a manifesto signed by 100 academic economists called for the elimination of temporary and
permanent contracts and the introduction of a single open-ended contract. Since then, there have been
di¤erent reforms, but the dual labor market structure has not changed fundamentally (see Bentolila, Dolado
and Jimeno 2012). Recently, the Deputy Prime Minister of Spain, Carmen Calvo, called for "rationalization"
of working hours in Spain and state that "being a young and working woman and trying to be a mother, with
or without a partner, is practically impossible" (https://www.elperiodico.com/es/sociedad/20180710/calvo-
anuncia-ley-reforma-horaria-6935395).
10For papers that model joint labor supply and fertility decisions, see, among others, Mott (1984), Hotz
and Miller (1988), Francesconi (2002), Caucutt, Guner and Knowles (2002), Erosa, Fuster and Restuccia
(2010), and Eckstein, Kean and Lifshitz (2019).
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for delayed childbearing.11 Our focus is on the uncertainty that emerges from labor market
transitions. The e¤ect of labor market transitions on fertility has also been studied by Da
Rocha and Fuster (2006). They show that di¤erences in job-nding rates can account for
fertility di¤erences between Spain and the US. We explore the issue more broadly and incor-
porate into analysis dual labor markets and labor market inexibility. Our framework allows
us to disentangle the role of duality from the role of uncertainty. We explore how di¤erent
forms of uncertainty in labor market transitions a¤ect TFR and study the interactions be-
tween dual labor markets and the prevalence of split-shift jobs. We nd that duality is just
one form of uncertainty that leads to low TFR in Spain and that other forms of uncertainty
may have similar implications. Another closely-related paper is by Lopes (2019), who studies
the e¤ects of temporary contracts on fertility in Portugal. She models durations and renewal
of temporary contracts in more detail than we do, which allows her to study a richer set
of experiments. On the other hand, she does not di¤erentiate between unemployment and
out-of-labor force states. Our analysis, on the other hand, shows that the entry of women to
the labor force is critical to understand how labor market frictions a¤ect fertility. We also
provide a richer set-up to study how factors other than temporary contracts a¤ect fertility
decisions and interact with temporary contracts.
Our second contribution is to explore how di¤erent degrees of exibility (in terms of the
prevalence of split-shift jobs) a¤ect fertility. The impact of exibility on female labor market
outcomes has been studied in several recent papers. Their message is that women balance
family and work by choosing occupations that o¤er them a higher degree of exibility. In
Erosa, Fuster, Kambourov and Rogerson (2017) and Cubas et al. (2019) a substantial frac-
tion of the observed gender-wage gap emerges as a result of occupational choice and labor
supply. Their analysis, however, abstracts from fertility decisions. Adda, Dustmann and
Stevens (2017) build a model with endogenous fertility and occupational choice to study
how children a¤ect career choices of women in Germany. In their model, females choose
between low-wage-growth occupations that are more child-friendly and high-wage-growth
occupations that carry a penalty for career breaks. Our focus is, however, on the fertility
margin as a way to cope with inexibility. Del Boca and Sauer (2008) estimate a model
of labor force participation and fertility to disentangle the relative importance of state de-
pendence and unobserved heterogeneity for Italy, Spain and France. They nd that the
rst-order state dependence is the most critical factor determining female labor supply be-
havior. Furthermore, the order of state-dependence e¤ects across countries is correlated with
aggregate measures of labor market exibility and childcare availability.
Finally, other potential drivers of the fertility decision have been considered. Bick (2016)
shows that lower childcare costs, in the form of childcare subsidies, have a signicant e¤ect
on female labor force participation in Germany. He nds, however, relatively small e¤ects on
11De la Croix and Pommeret (2018) show that uncertainty surrounding income growth itself increases with
childbearing.
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fertility. In our framework, we nd that the impact of a reduction in childcare cost is modest
compared to the e¤ects of eliminating of duality or split-shift jobs. On the other hand,
Doepke and Kindermann (2019) show that in a model in which couples bargain over fertility
and childcare, policies that lower the childcare burden of mothers can have a signicant e¤ect
on fertility. Kim, Tertilt and Yum (2019) focus on Korea, another high-income country with
very low TFR. They show that if parents care about their childrens relative status in society,
they might choose to have a very small number of children but invest in them a lot in their
education.
2 Facts
In this section, we document key facts on labor market status and fertility decisions of
college-educated women (women with at least a college degree) in Spain. Our main data
source is the 2005-2010 Continuous Sample of Working Lives (Muestra Continua de Vidas
Laborales con Datos Fiscales, the MCVL). The MCVL is a 4% random sample of individuals
registered to the Spanish Social Security during a reference year. Starting from a reference
year, e.g. 2010, and going back, the MCVL traces the social security records of individuals
up to their rst employment (or up to 1980 for the older cohorts). At any moment, a
working-age individual can have a social security record if she is employed or is receiving
unemployment benets.
The unit of observation in the MCVL is an individual labor market spell, which can be
employment with a particular contract (a job spell) or unemployment (an unemployment
spell). Each spell is characterized by a start date, an end date, and a rm identier. For
each job spell, the MCVL provides information on part-time or full-time status, sector of
employment (public or private), industry, occupation, and type of contract (temporary or
permanent). It also provides working hours expressed as a percentage of a full-time equivalent
job, which, combined with the information on the number of working days in each month and
the monthly contribution base, allows us to construct full-time equivalent daily earnings. The
MCVL also provides individual characteristics contained in social security records, such as
age and gender. The MCVL is matched with municipal records, which provide demographic
characteristic of individuals, such as nationality, education, marital status, the number of
children, and new births.
Based on labor market spells, we construct a quarterly panel data set on labor market
status and transitions of women in the MCVL. We start constructing the quarterly panel
using the individuals that are registered to social security in 2010. For these individuals
we trace their complete labor market history up to their rst employment (or to 1980) and
use the municipal records to add their demographic characteristics. For individuals who
are not included in 2010, but appear in previous editions, we follow the same procedure.
Hence, in each quarter for a person who is employed, we know her personal and work-related
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characteristics. We restrict the analysis to native married women with at least a college
degree who were born between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4 and are between 39 to 45 years old in
2010. Further details on the construction of the quarterly panel are provided in Appendix
A.
While the MCVL is an excellent data source to capture the relation between temporary
contracts and fertility, it also has shortcomings. First, it does not provide information on
individuals who are out of the labor force. As a result, we use the Spanish Labor Force
Survey (Encuesta de Población Activa, the EPA) and its rotating panel component (EPA-
ujos or the EPA-ows) to construct stocks of individuals who are employed, unemployed
and out of the labor force, and ows among these labor market states. Second, it is not
possible to construct total household earnings from the MCVL since couples can not be
matched, while the EPA does not contain any information on earnings. Therefore, we use
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (the EU-SILC) to construct
household level income measures. Finally, we use the Spanish Time Use Survey (the STUS)
to obtain information on workers with split-shift and regular work schedules. Appendix A
also provides further details on these data sets.
The following facts emerge from our analysis:
1. Fertility among College-Educated Women is very Low (especially if they
are employed): For college-educated married women between ages 25 and 44, Figure
5 shows the fraction of them who has a child. By age 30, only about 20% of these
women have a child. Even by age 35, fraction of mothers is 63%. There is, however,
a signicant di¤erence between women who work and women who do not. The upper
panel of Table 1 shows the average number of children for employed and non-employed
(unemployed or out of the labor force) women at di¤erent ages. Working mothers
have a smaller number of children than non-working mothers by age 44; they have 1.5
children while non-working mothers have 1.8 children. Working mothers have their
children much later as well; at age 30, they have only 0.26 children while non-working
10
mothers have 0.81.
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Figure 5. Cumulative Distribution of Married Women with Children
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010.
Sample: Native, married women with college education or more, born between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4.
Table 1. Average Number of Children, Married Women
Age Employeda Non-Employedc
30 0.26 0.81
35 0.98 1.56
40 1.50 1.78
44 1.51 1.82
By Earnings Tercile at Age 44b
1st 1.35
2nd 1.49
3rd 1.72
Source: a,bThe MCVL, 2005-2010. cThe EPA, 1987-2010.
Sample: a,bNative, married women with college education or more, born between
1966Q1 and 1971Q4.c Native, married women with college education or more
born between 1966 and 1971 (only household heads and spouses).
2. Fertility is Positively Correlated with Womens Earnings: The lower panel of
Table 1 shows how completed fertility at age 44 di¤ers by married womens earnings.
The completed fertility is increasing with mothersearnings. The number of children
at age 44 is 1.35 for married women who are in the bottom third of the earnings
distribution, while it increases to 1.72 children for women who are in the top third.
3. Temporary Contracts are very Prevalent, even among College-Educated
Women. Figure 6 shows the fraction of women who work with a temporary contract
11
at di¤erent ages. At around age 25, 57% of college-educated women work with a
temporary contract. As women age, the fraction of women with a temporary contract
declines rapidly. Between ages 25 to 44, the fraction of women with a temporary
contract is about 25%.
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Figure 6. Fraction of women working on a temporary contract
Source: The EPA, 1987-2010.
Sample: Native, married women with college education or more born between 1966 and 1971
(only household heads and spouses).
4. Transitions from Temporary to Permanent Contracts are Lower for Females:
Table 2 shows the transitions among di¤erent labor market states for women. All states,
in particular working with a temporary contract, are highly persistent. Each quarter,
only about 6.2% of college-educated women who had a temporary contract last quarter
moves to a permanent contract. This rate is 8.56%, or 2.3 percentage points higher,
12
for married men with college education.
Table 2. Quarterly Transition Rates across Labor Market States, aged 30-34
Married women Ot Ut Tt Pt
Ot 1 84.22 10.02 4.69 1.07
Ut 1 13.08 72.69 12.31 1.92
Tt 1 4.92 5.18 83.68 6.22
Pt 1 0.92 0.46 1.11 97.50
Below College College and above
Married men Nt Tt Pt Nt Tt Pt
Nt 1 67.17 30.56 2.27 80.00 18.18 1.82
Tt 1 8.24 86.35 5.42 5.88 85.56 8.56
Pt 1 0.81 2.04 97.15 0.26 0.77 98.97
Source: The EPA-ows, 2000Q1-2000Q4.
Sample: Married women with college education or more born between 1966 and 1970
and their potential husbands (married men born between 1966 and 1970). Notes: (i) O:
Out of Labor Force, U: Unemployed N: Non-employed, T: Employed with a temporary
contract, P: Employed with a permanent contract. (ii) 1966-1970 cohort is 30-34 years
old in 2000.
The results in Table 2 can be due to selection if men and women with temporary con-
tracts di¤er systematically along di¤erent characteristics, such as sector of employment,
occupation, and tenure. In order to check whether the negative association between
gender and promotions is robust to such controls, we focus on childless individuals
working with a temporary contract in a given quarter and model the probability of a
promotion from a temporary to a permanent job in the following quarter as
Pr(yijt+1 = 1jFi; Pit+1; FiPit+1;xit; zijt; 't; yijt = 0; Pit = 0) (1)
= L( + Fi + Pit+1 + FiPit+1 + xit + zijt+'t);
where the outcome variable yijt+1 takes the value of 1 if individual i = 1; :::; n employed
in rm j = 1; :::;m with a temporary contract in quarter t is promoted to a permanent
contract in quarter t+ 1 and 0 otherwise.
The set of explanatory variables include a binary gender indicator (Fi), a binary indi-
cator for individuals who had a child and became a parent between quarter t and t+ 1
(Pit+1), which allows us to di¤erentiate the e¤ects of gender from the e¤ect of chil-
dren, and the interaction between gender and having children (FiPit+1). The relation
between gender and the probability of promotion is given by , the impact of children
on the probability of promotion is given by , and  measures the di¤erential impact
of children on promotion probability between men and women. The vector xit includes
other personal characteristics, such as age, and the vector zijt contains work-related
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characteristics, such as rm tenure, full-time employment, an indicator for public sec-
tor employment, occupation, and industry. In addition to individual and work-related
characteristics, the model also controls for year xed-e¤ects 't. The function L is the
standard logistic distribution.
Table 3 shows the odds ratio estimates from the logistic regressions. In columns 1 and
2, we present the results when we only control for gender and when we only control
for having a child, respectively. Both being a female and having a child are negatively
and signicantly associated with promotion probabilities. However, once we control
for gender, having a child does not play a signicant role in promotions. In column 3,
where we only control for gender, the indicator for having a child, and the interaction
between them, we nd that it is only the gender that matters. In particular, females,
on average, are about 10% less likely to be promoted than males. As we move across
the columns, we gradually add other personal and work-related characteristics. In the
most demanding specication (Column 4), where we control for all covariates along
with year xed-e¤ects, the odds ratio estimate implies that females, on average, are
22% less likely to be promoted than men.
Table 3. Gender and the Probability of Promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.838 - 0.902 0.870 0.865 0.780
(0.029) (0.040) (0.039) (0.055) (0.054)
Parent - 0.772** 0.847 0.848 1.062 1.018
(0.098) (0.115) (0.115) (0.188) (0.181)
Female  Parent - - 0.523 0.536 0.585 0.589
(0.212) (0.217) (0.315) (0.319)
Personal characteristics NO NO NO YES YES YES
Work-related characteristics NO NO NO NO YES YES
Year xed e¤ects NO NO NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 80,623 80,623 80,623 80,623 44,038 44,038
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010. Sample: Native, married women with college-education or more
born between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4 and native married men born between 1964Q1 and 1969Q4.
See text for additional sample restrictions. Notes: (i) Reported are the odds ratio estimates. (ii)
Individual level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. (iii) p < 0:1, p < 0:05,
p < 0:01: (iv) Personal characteristics include age. Work-related characteristics are rm
tenure (in quarters), a binary indicator for public sector, a binary indicator for full-time,
occupation dummies (ten social security categories) and NACE one-digit industry dummies
(nine categories). All models include a constant term.
5. Temporary Contracts are Associated with Lower Fertility. Table 4 shows
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the probability that a childless married woman, conditional on her current contract
type, gives birth four quarters later. About 2.3% of childless women with a temporary
contract are expected to have a child one year later. The probability is quite higher,
about 3.4% for women with a permanent contract.
Table 4. Probability of Transition to Maternity by Type of Contract
Childless at t Give birth at t
Permanent contract at t  4 96.60 3.40
Temporary contract at t  4 97.70 2.30
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010. Sample: Native, married women with
college education or more, born between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4.
As it was the case for the association between gender and the promotions, the results
in Table 4 can reect di¤erences in personal and work-related characteristics. In Table
5, we show the odds ratio estimates from the following model
Pr(yit = 1jyit 1 = 0; eit 4 = 1; Tit 4;xit; zit 4; 't) = L( + Tit 4 + xit + zit 4+'t);
(2)
where outcome variable yit now takes the value of 1 if individual i = 1; :::; n has the rst
birth at a specic quarter t, given that she did not have a (rst) child in previous quarter
(yit 1 = 0) and was employed (eit 4 = 1) in the preceding year.12 The coe¢ cient of
interest, ; is on the binary indicator of working with a temporary contract in the
preceding year Tit 4. The vectors xit and zit 4 again contain personal characteristics
(at quarter t); work-related characteristics (in the preceding year), and 't is the year
xed-e¤ect.
The column 1 presents the results of a simple specication where we only control for
the temporary contract indicator. The odds ratio estimate is less than one suggesting
a negative and signicant association between temporary contracts and fertility. In
the next three columns, we gradually add personal and work-related characteristics.
In nal column, where we control for all covariates together with year xed-e¤ects, the
estimated odds ratio suggests that childless women who are employed with a tempo-
rary contract are 28% less likely to have a (rst) child than childless women who are
12Women drop out of the sample if they have a rst child. Otherwise, they are in the sample for the
following quarter. Each additional quarter is considered an independent observation, but the standard
errors are clustered at individual level for the possible intra-group correlations.
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employed with a permanent contract.
Table 5. Temporary Contracts and the First Birth Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temporaryt 4 0.633 0.672 0.661 0.723
(0.031) (0.035) (0.053) (0.059)
Personal characteristics NO YES YES YES
Work-related characteristics NO NO YES YES
Year xed e¤ects NO NO NO YES
Number of observations 66,286 66,286 37,581 37,581
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010. Sample: Native, married women with college-education or more
born between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4. See text for additional sample restrictions. Notes: (i) Reported
are the odds ratio estimates. (ii) Individual level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
(iii) p < 0:1; p < 0:05; p < 0:01: (iv) Personal characteristics include age.
Work-related characteristics are rm tenure (in quarters), a binary indicator for public sector, a
binary indicator for full-time, occupation dummies (ten social security categories) and NACE one-
digit industry dummies (nine categories). All models include a constant term.
Tables 4 and 5 show that women with temporary contracts are less likely to have
children at a point in time. These women might still have, however, the same total
number of children as those with a permanent contract, but simply have their children
later. In Table 6 we show the role of temporary contracts along the life-cycle. To this
end, we split women between ages 25 and 44 into two groups: those who spent less
than 50% of their working life with temporary contract and those who spent 50% or
more of their working life with a temporary. We then compare the number of children
these women have at di¤erent ages. A college-educated woman who was employed in a
temporary contract for 50% or more of her employed life has about 1.27 kids by age 44.
The number of children is higher, about 1.53, for women who spend less time employed
in temporary contracts. Di¤erences between these two groups open up early; at age
35 there is a di¤erence of about 0.14 children and the gap is not closed as they age.
Table 6. Number of Children by Time Spent on Temporary Contracts, aged 25-44
<50% 50%
Married at age 35 1.01 0.87
Married at age 40 1.53 1.37
Married at age 44 1.53 1.27
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010. Sample: Native, married women with college education or more, born
between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4. See text for further sample restrictions. We restrict the sample to women who
were employed at least 50% of the time between 1996Q1 and 2010Q4.
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6. Mothers are Less Likely to Work in Split-Shift Schedule Jobs: Finally, we
document the relation between split-shift schedule jobs and fertility. In the STUS
2009-2010, about 26% of mothers between ages 25 to 44 hold a split-shift schedule
contract. The fraction is quite higher for women who do not have children; about
44%.13 This di¤erence can reect the extra cost that split-shift schedules entail for
women with children. To compute this cost, we calculate the time interval between the
rst time and the last time a worker is indicating that she is working in a day. This
interval is 7.03 hours for women with a standard contract and 8.31 for women with a
split-shift contract. For women with split-shift contacts, the longer interval involves
breaks, which make childcare arrangements more di¢ cult.14
In order to investigate the association between motherhood and probability of working
with a split-shift schedule, we once again run a logistic regression
Pr(yi = 1j; Fi; Pi; FiPi;xi; Ii; zi) = L( + Fi + Pi + FiPi + xi + Ii + zi); (3)
where outcome variable yi takes the value of 1 if individual i = 1; :::; n works with
a split-shift schedule and 0 otherwise. The set of predictors include a binary gender
indicator (Fi), a binary indicator for presence of own children in the household (Pi) and
the interaction between them (FiPi). The vector xi includes personal characteristics,
such as age and region, and Ii is the household income. The vector zi contains work-
related characteristics, such as full-time employment, temporary contract, occupation,
and industry, as well as indicators for having a second job and whether the respondent
stated to have exible working hours.
Table 7 presents the odds ratio estimates from various logistic regressions. Column 1
presents the results when we only include a gender indicator, while in column 2 we
only control for an indicator for presence of own children in the household (i.e. being
a parent). In column 3, we control for both gender and presence of own children in the
household, as well as their interaction. The odds ratios show a signicant di¤erence
between men and women for the impact of children on probability of working in a
split-shift job (i.e. although we do not observe signicant di¤erence between childless
men and women, we see a signicant negative impact of children on females but not on
males). Mothers are about 57% less likely to work with a split-shift schedule compared
13The respondents are asked whether they work with a split-shift or regular schedule, so the fraction of
mothers and non-mothers who work with a split contract is simply the fraction of those who answer that
their work schedule is a split one. We restrict the sample to native, married, 25-44 years old women with at
least a college education, but as the sample size is small, we do not restrict the sample to a particular cohort
of women. We only consider employees who lled the diary in an ordinary/usual day in a regular working
week and who worked that week. In the sample, about 35% of women hold jobs with a split-shift schedule,
and split-shift jobs are observed across di¤erent occupations, industries, and regions.
14The STUS 2009-2010 time-diaries include information on whether the respondent is working or not
within each 15-minute interval (from 6.00am-6.14am to 5.45am-5.59am) within 24 hours.
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to men and women without children. As we move across columns from left to right,
we again gradually add personal characteristics, household income, and work-related
characteristics, and odds ratio remains signicant and similar in magnitude.
Table 7. Motherhood and the Probability of Working with a Split-Shift Schedule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.446 - 0.843 0.746 0.806 1.097
(0.060) (0.236) (0.214) (0.234) (0.363)
Parent - 0.818 1.017 1.182 1.163 1.181
(0.120) (0.181) (0.219) (0.217) (0.235)
Female  Parent - - 0.431 0.453 0.457 0.428
(0.139) (0.149) (0.150) (0.152)
Personal characteristics NO NO NO YES YES YES
Household income NO NO NO NO YES YES
Work-related characteristics NO NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174 1,174
Source: The Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS) 2009-2010. Sample: 25-44 years old native, married
women with at least a college degree and 25-44 years old native, married men. Sample is further
restricted to wage earners. Notes: (i) Standard errors in parentheses. (ii) p < 0:1; p < 0:05;
p < 0:01:(iii) Personal characteristics include age and regional dummies (seven categories).
Household income is net average monthly household income (four categories <1200 euros, between
1201 and 2000 euros, between 2001 and 3000 euros, and >3000 euros). Work-related characteristics
include a binary indicator for full-time employment, CNO one-digit occupation dummies (regrouped,
ve categories), CNAE one digit industry dummies (regrouped, nine categories), a binary indicator
for having a second job, a binary indicator for having exible working hours, and a binary indicator
for having a temporary contract. All models include a constant term.
3 Model
To study the e¤ects of labor market frictions and childcare costs on fertility, we next build a
life-cycle model where married females make labor force participation, fertility, and savings
decisions. The model economy is populated by married households. Each married household
consists of two potential earners, a male (m) and a female (f): Individuals are born married
and do not experience marital transitions. Husbands and wives age together. Males can
have low (less than college) or high (college or more) education, denoted by em 2 f0; 1g:We
focus on the behavior of college-educated females and suppress the education indicator for
them: Besides their education, individuals also di¤er by their ability levels, denoted by a.
The ability levels for a couple are drawn from a joint distribution, F (af ; am); at the start of
the life and remain constant afterwards.
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Demographics Model period is a quarter. We focus on the behavior of women between
ages 25 (j = 1) and 54 (J = 54 4). Fertility decisions are uncertain in the sense that even
if a woman would like to have a child, she may not get pregnant. Fertility opportunities
decrease with a womans age. Let j be the probability that a female of age j gets pregnant,
conditional on her decision to have a baby.
Once children are born, they age stochastically. There are three age groups for children:
less than 2 (babies), between 2 and 15 (children), and more than 15 years olds (young adults).
Each period a baby becomes a child with probability b = 1=8. After age 2, children face
a probability c of becoming a young adult each period. We set c = 1=52; so on average
childhood lasts 13 years and young adulthood starts at age 15. We assume that if a female
has a baby, she can not have another one in that period. We denote by n1 2 f0; 1g the
number of babies in the household. The number of children and young adults are denoted
by n2 and n3, respectively. Let n = fn1; n2; n3g be a vector that indicates number of children
in each age group, and n = n1 + n2 + n3 be the total number of children in the household.
Let b 2 f0; 1g indicate whether or not a household decides to have a baby: Then, for a
household with n; the number of babies next period is given by
n01 =
8>><>>:
1 with prob. j if n1 = 0 and b = 1
0 with prob. (1  j) if n1 = 0 and b = 1
0 with prob b if n1 = 1
1 with prob (1  b) if n1 = 1
: (4)
Similarly, n2 evolves according to
n02 =
8>><>>:
n2 + 1 with prob. b(1  c) if n1 = 1
n2 with prob. (1  b)(1  c) if n1 = 1
n2 with prob. (1  c) if n1 = 0
n2   1 with prob. c if n1 = 0 and n2 > 0
: (5)
Finally, the number of young adults next period reads
n03 =
8<:
n3 with prob. (1  c) if n2 > 0
n3 + 1 with prob. c if n2 > 0
n3 if n2 = 0
: (6)
Hence, all households start with n = f0; 0; 0g; rst move to n = f1; 0; 0g and end up with
n = f0; 0; ng. We represent this stochastic structure as15
n0 =  (n;b; j):
15In order to save computational time, when we solve the model we assume that when a baby arrives to a
household all existing children become babies. Since when a female has a baby, she cant have another one,
this assumption implies that in a household there are either only babies or only children.
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Preferences Each period, a married female decides whether or not to work, how much
to consume, how much to save, and whether or not to have another child. Each female has
one unit of time endowment each period. Her preferences are given by
u(c; n; `; j) = log

c

(n)

+ 1
exp(j   3)
1 + exp(j   3)
(n+ n)2 +  log(`); (7)
where c is consumption, 
(n) is the household equivalence scale, ` is leisure, and n is the
total number of children. In this formulation n denotes an exogenously given number of
children from which parents get utility, independent of the number of children they have.
This is a standard feature of models with fertility, which allows us to pin down the fraction
of childless females. We also assume that utility that parentsget from children is increasing
in parents age, given by exp(j 3)
1+exp(j 3) term. This term captures other factors that might push
parents to delay their fertility, such as housing or other high xed-cost investments.
Labor Market - Females A married women can be in one of three labor market
states: working, unemployed or out-of-labor force. Each women is endowed with one unit of
time each period. We assume that all jobs are full-time and require l units of time. Each
period, with probability ; an unemployed female receives a job o¤er. If she accepts the
o¤er, she starts working next period. If she rejects the o¤er, she also decides whether to
continue to be unemployed or move out of the labor force. Only unemployed workers can
get job o¤ers. They have to incur, however, a search cost in terms of leisure, denoted by .
Females who are out of the labor force do not receive job o¤ers, and do not incur this costs.
In order to receive job o¤ers, a female, who is out of the labor force, has to enter rst the
labor force as unemployed.
There are two types of jobs in the economy: temporary and permanent, denoted by
indicator P = 0 and P = 1; respectively. Jobs also di¤er by the type of work schedule they
o¤er. They can have a split-shift or a regular work schedule, denoted by indicator S = 1
and S = 0; respectively: Split contracts have a xed time cost denoted by : Hence, total
working hours for a split-shift contract is l +  ; while the worker only receives a wage for l
hours. We assume that a fraction  of all new job o¤ers (temporary or permanent) have a
split-shift schedule.
All new jobs start as temporary. A female with a temporary contract is promoted to a
permanent job with probability f0;1 =  and the probability of staying with a temporary is
given by f0;0 = 1  : Each period a job can be destroyed with probability P : Temporary
contracts have a higher probability of being destroyed, i.e. 0 > 1:
Females accumulate human capital, h; as they work. Each female starts her life with
h = 1; and if she works in a given age then her next period human capital is given
ln(h0) = lnh+ ln(1 + 1 + 2j): (8)
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Each extra quarter of work on a job is associated with a 1 percent growth in wages. The
growth rate, however, declines with age since 2 < 0:We assume that there is no depreciation
associated with not working.
The wage rate of a female depends on her ability, human capital, and the type of contract,
and is given by
wf (a; h; P ) = Pah; (9)
where 1 = 1; and 0 < 1 is the wage penalty for temporary contracts.
Labor Market - Males All males are in the labor force. They do not make any
decisions and their labor market status changes exogenously. Males can be in three di¤erent
labor market states: working with a temporary contract, working with a permanent contract,
or unemployed. Let m 2 f0; 1; ug denote these labor market states, and mx;x0 ; for x; x0 2
f0; 1; ug, be the associated transition probabilities from employment state x to x0:
Wage rate for a male of age-j depends on his education, ability, and type-of contract and
is given by
wm(em; a; j; P ) = a exp(!
e;P
0 + !
e;P
1 j + !
e;P
2 j
2): (10)
Child Care Costs Each period a working female with children has to pay childcare
costs. We assume that childcare costs are independent of the number and age of children
in the household. We also assume that not all households pay childcare costs. A household
can have access to informal childcare (e.g. grandparents), denoted by g 2 f0; 1g: If g = 1;
a household has access to grandparents (or other relatives) and does not pay any childcare
cost. We assume that g = 1 for a fraction ' of all households.
The per-child childcare costs also depend on whether a female works with a split-shift or
regular contract and are given by
D(g; l; S) =

d
 
1 + S
l

; if g = 0
0; if g = 1
: (11)
If a household does not use informal care, then they pay d if S = 0 (i.e. the mother works in
a regular schedule). If the mother works with a split-shift contract, her childcare costs are
given by d(1 + 
l
); i.e. they are increased by =l, the xed time cost of split-shift contracts.
Besides monetary costs, young (0 to 2 years old) children also imply a xed time cost for
their mother, denoted by :
Government There is a government that taxes individuals and uses the tax revenue
to provide means-tested transfers, unemployment benets, and to nance government con-
sumption. Let G(I) denote any means-tested transfers from the government to the household
where I is the total household income. Let T (I) be the taxes that an individual with income
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level I pays. We assume that unemployed individuals get a  2 (0; 1) fraction of average
labor income in the economy as unemployment benets, and let  be di¤erent for females
and males with low and high education.
4 Household Problem
Let s = (em; af ; am; g) be the permanent characteristics of a household. Suppose the wife
has a type-(P; S) job, her human capital level is h; the labor market status of her husband
is m, and household assets are given by k: Then, the problem of an age-j female with n
children, who is currently employed, is given by
V wj (s; k;n; P; S; h; m) = max
k0;b
u(c; n; `; j)
+(1  P )EW oj+1(s; k0;n0; P 0; S; h0; 0mjP; m;n; b)
+PEW
no
j+1(s; k
0;n0; 0mjm;n; b);
subject to
c+ k0 +D(g; l; S)J (n1 + n2) = Im + If + k(1 + r) +G(I)  T (If + kr
2
)  T (Im + kr
2
);
ln(h0) = lnh+ ln(1 + 1 + 2j);
where
` = 1  l   (n1)  S;
and
Im =

wm(e; a; j; m) if m 2 f0; 1g
emI lab if m = u:
; If = pah;
where J (x) is an indicator function with J (x) = 1 if x > 0; I lab is the average labor income
in the economy and emI lab is the unemployment payment for an unemployed husband with
education level e:
Hence, a married female has earnings given by Pah ; which are increasing in her human
capital. Given her husbands earnings (Im), which depend on whether he is employed or
unemployed, a married female decides how much to consume (c) and whether to have a baby
(b). She enjoys ` = 1   l   J (n1)   S units of leisure, which reects her labor market
hours, child care time for babies (), and the xed cost of work associated with split-shift
jobs ().
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If she does not loose her job, which happens with probability 1  P ; then the expected
value of having the opportunity to work next period is given by
EW oj+1(s; k
0;n0; P 0; S; h0; 0mjP; m;n; b) =X
0m
X
P 0
X
n0
maxfV wj+1(s; k0;n0; P 0; S; h0; 0m); V uj+1(s; k0;n0; 0m); V npj+1(s; k0;n0; 0m)g
mm;0m
f
P;P 0 (n; b; j);
where mm;0m is the exogenous transition probabilities on husbands labor market status,
fP;P 0 is probability of being promoted from type P to type P
0 contract, and n0 =  (n; b; j)
is the transition probabilities for the number of children.
Similarly, EW noj+1 is the expected value for a women who does not have an o¤er, and
hence decides whether to search (be unemployed) or move out of labor market, reads as
EW noj+1(s; k
0;n0; 0mjm;n; b) =X
0m
X
n0
maxfV uj+1(s; k0;n0; 0m); V npj+1(s; k0;n0; 0m)gmm;0m (n; b; j);
In order to save on computational time, we set V wJ+1(s; k;n; P; S; h; m); the end-of-life
value functions as follows: we assume that both the husband and the wife keep their last
periods (period J 0s) labor market income for 10 more years (i.e. from ages 55 to 64), at
age 65 they retire, and live for 10 more periods. During retirement, they only have asset
income. After age 54, they get utility from the number of children they had at age 54 until
age 75, but do not incur any cost associated to children (in terms of time, childcare costs
or consumption congestion). Hence, after age 54, households solve a simple consumption
savings problem with a constant labor income for 10 years, and no labor income for another
10.16
4.1 Value Function of Unemployed
An unemployed woman receives unemployment benets f : The household income is then
given by the sum of f and the earnings of the husband. Like a woman who is employed,
an unemployed woman decides how much to consume and how much to save and whether
to have a new baby. In contrast to a working woman, her human capital remains the same,
i.e. h0 = h: Her problem is given by
V ut (s; k;n; h; m) = max
k0;b
u(c; n; `; j) + EW oj+1(s; k
0;n0; h0 = h; 0mjm;n; b)
+(1  )EW noj+1(s; k0;n0; h0 = h; mjm;n; d)
16This approach is common in structural model of life-cycle decisions, see e.g. Eckstein et al. (2019).
23
subject to
c+ k0 = Im + If + k(1 + r) +G(I)  T (If + kr
2
)  T (Im + kr
2
);
where
` = 1     J (n1);
If = fI lab and Im =

wm(e; a; j; m) if m 2 f0; 1g
emI lab if m = u
,
If she has an opportunity to work, EW oj+1(s; k
0;n0; 0m) captures the expectations over an
unconditional distribution over S 0 (whether her new job has a split-shift or regular schedule)
as well as children:
EW oj+1(s; k
0;n0; h0; 0mjm;n; b)
=
X
0m
X
S0
X
n0
maxfV wj+1(s; k0;n0; 0; S 0; h0; m); V uj+1(s; k0;n0; 0m); V npj+1(s; k0;n0; 0m)g
mm;0m(S
0) (n0; b; j);
where 0mm is the exogenous transition probabilities on males labor market status, and
 (n0; b; j) are the transition probabilities for the number of children as dened above. Here
(S 0) is the distribution of temporary jobs with respect to the work schedules. Note that
all jobs start as temporary (P = 0).
Similarly, if a female does not have a job o¤er, her expected value next period is given
by
EW noj+1(s; k
0;n0; h0; mjm;n; b) =X
0m
X
n0
maxfV uj+1(s; k0;n0; 0m); V npj+1(s; k0;n; 0m)gmm;0m (n; b; j):
4.2 Value function of Non-participants
Finally, the problem of a j-years old female who is out of labor force is given by
V npt (s; k;n; h; m) = max
k0;b
u(c; n; ` = 1  (n1); j) + EW noj+1(s; k0;n0; h0 = h; mjm;n; b)
subject to
c+ k0 = Im + If + k(1 + r) +G(I)  T (If + kr
2
)  T (Im + kr
2
);
If = 0 and Im =

wm(e; a; j; m) if m 2 f0; 1g
emI lab if m = u
,
and
EW noj+1(s; k
0;n0; h0; mjm;n; b)
=
X
0m
X
n0
maxfV uj+1(s; k0;n0; h0; 0m); V npj+1(s; k0;n; h0; 0m)gmm;0m (n; b; j):
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5 The Benchmark Economy
In order to calibrate the benchmark economy, we proceed in two steps. In the rst step, we
set several parameters to their data counterparts. These parameters are listed in Table 8.
Based on the EPA, we assume that 49% of college-educated females are married to college-
educated males.17 The average long-term real interest rates in Spain were around 1.6%,
while the average real deposit rates were close to zero in recent decades.18 We set r = 0:8%
as an intermediate value. We also adopt the modied OECD household equivalence scale
and set 
(n) = 1 + 0:5 + 0:3n; i.e. we assume that the second adult counts 50% of the rst
adult while each child counts as 30% of the rst adult.19
In order to set values for ; we calculate the average incomes of unemployed individuals
from unemployment benets (which might be zero if an unemployed individual does not
receive any unemployment insurance) as a fraction of the average labor income using data
from the EU-SILC.20 We nd f = 0:089; 
0
m = 0:142; and 
1
m = 0:109:We set l; the average
working hours in a standard-time contract, to 0.4. We take j values, which determine the
probability that an age-j woman might get pregnant upon trying, from Sommer (2016, Figure
1).21
We select the parameters of the wage process for males
wm(e; a; j; P ) = a exp(!
e;P
0 + !
e;P
1 j + !
e;P
2 j
2); (12)
in order to match the age-earnings proles of males in the data Figure 7.22 Finally, the
employment transitions for males between temporary contracts, permanent contracts and
unemployment, mm;0m , can be calculated directly from the data in Table 2. When males
enter the labor market at age 25, distribution across di¤erent labor market states are also
17We use pooled data from the EPA for 1987-2010. The sample is restricted to 25-44 years old married
native women with college education or above born between 1966 and 1971 and their husbands.
18The real interest rates are calculated as the nominal rates minus the CPI-ination. The
data on long-term interest rates and the consumer prices index is taken from the OECD data-
base (https://data.oecd.org/interest/long-term-interest-rates.htm, and https://data.oecd.org/interest/long-
term-interest-rates.htm). The data on deposit rates is taken from the monthly Statistical Bul-
letin of the Bank of Spain. The numbers refer to average values for 2003-2018 period
(https://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/infoest/bolest.html).
19http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD-Note-EquivalenceScales.pdf.
20We use pooled data from the EU-SILC from 2006 to 2012. We restrict sample to married couples in
which wife is born between 1966 and 1971 born, native, with college education or more, and 25-44 years old.
Then for household heads and spouses, we calculate the average incomes of unemployed from unemployment
insurance (including zeros) as a fraction of the average labor income (using gross employee cash or near cash
income) of the employed.
21Probability of not being able to conceive is 8% at age 20, increases slowly to 23% by age 30, and then
rapidly to 57.5% at age 40 and 95% at age 45.
22In the simulations, the earnings of a college-educated husband with a permanent contract at the age 25
of her wife is normalized to 1. As a result, we also transform the data by subtracting from the average log
earnings at each age the log(68), where 68 is the average daily earnings of a high-educated husband with a
permanent contract at the age of 27 (her wife would be 25) in the data.
25
taken directly from the data (Table A1a). Figure 8 shows how well the model matches the
labor market status for men along the life-cycle.
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
25 30 35 40 45
Perm Perm-data
Temp Temp-data
College
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
25 30 35 40 45
Perm Perm-data
Temp Temp-data
Below College
Figure 7. Age-Earnings Proles for Males
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010.
Sample: Native, married men born between 1964Q1-1969Q4.
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Figure 8. Labor Market Outcomes for Males (model vs. data)
Source: The EPA, 1987-2010. Sample: Husbands of native, married women born between 1966 and 1971.
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We assume that the transfer function G(I) takes the following form
G(I)
I
=

g0 if I = 0
g1 + g2(I=I)

if I > 0
; (13)
where I is the mean household income. We estimate g0; g1 and g2 using EU-SILC data on
transfer incomes.23 We nd that a household with no income receives a transfer that is about
4% of the mean household income in the economy (about 1900 Euros). The transfers decline
as a household gets richer and become zero around 2.4 times the mean household income.
Finally, following Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2014) and Heathcote, Storesletten and
Violante (2019), we assume that T (I) takes the following form
T (I) =
(
0; if I  eI
I maxf1  (1   0)(I=I) 1 ; 0g if I > eI ; (14)
where I is the mean income. Hence, households do not pay any taxes if their income is
below a certain threshold eI: Beyond eI; households face progressive tax schedule. We take
estimates of 1    0 = 0:904,  1 = 0:121;and eI = 0:47I from Garcia-Miralles, Guner, and
Ramos (2019). Households whose income is below 47% of the mean household income do
not pay any taxes. The parameter 1   (1    0) = 1   0:904 = 0:096 gives the average tax
rate for a household with mean income and parameter  1 determines the progressivity of
taxes.24
23We use pooled data from the EU-SILC from 2006 to 2012. We restrict the sample to households with
one married couple and only consider the household heads and the spouses. We further restrict wives to be
native, with college education or more, and 25 to 44 years old. Transfer income includes old-age benets,
survivorbenets, sickness benets, disability benets, education-related allowances, family/children related
allowances and housing allowances, and social exclusion not elsewhere classied. We calculate the total
transfer income for the entire household. Both the transfers and household income is reported as a fraction
of the average household income in the sample (about 48,043 Euros).
24With this tax function, a household with income level Xy (where X > 1); has an after-tax income of
(1  0)(Xy)1 1 : Hence, the ratio (1 0)(y)
1 1
(1 0)(Xy)1 1 =
 
1
X
1 1
< 1X , if 1 > 0:
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Table 8: Parameter Values
(Based on a priori Information)
Description Parameters/Values Comments
Wom. Married to Coll. Men. 0.49 The EPA
Time on Regular Contracts l = 0:4 Standard
Interest Rate (annual) r = 0:8% OECD, The Bank of Spain
Fecundity j Sommers (2006)
Male Wage Proles !e0;P ; !
e
1;P ; !
e
2;P Figure 7
Male Employment Transitions mm;0m ; for m; 
0
m 2 f0; 1; ug Tables 2 and A1a
Equivalence of Scale 
(n) = 1 + 0:5 + 0:3n OECD Modied Scale
Unemployment Benets f = 0:089; 
0
m = 0:142; 
1
m = 0:109 The EU-SILC
Transfers g0 = 0:037, g1 = 0:024, g2 =  0:01 The EU-SILC
Taxes 1   0 = 0:904,  1 = 0:121; eI = 0:47I Garcia-Miralles et al (2019)
In the second stage, we calibrate remaining 24 parameters to match a set of 24 targets.
To this end, we rst assume that the ability distribution, F e(af ; am), is joint normal with
parameters (af ; am ; af ; am ; ); where  is the correlation coe¢ cient, and normalize am =
1: For the initial, i.e. age 25, labor market states of females, we assume that a fraction 25
of them have an opportunity to work while remaining 1   25 do not. Those who have an
opportunity to work receive o¤ers according to the distribution of temporary and permanent
jobs in Table A1a. Given these job opportunities women at age 25 make decisions whether
or not to participate in the labor market and take jobs that they are o¤ered.
Table 9 shows the calibrated parameters. We organize the moments that we use to
discipline the parameters in Table 9 into three groups: inequality (Table 10), labor market
outcomes (Table 11), and fertility (Table 12). In Figures C1-C3 in Appendix C, we illustrate
how each of these targets change when we increase a single parameter by 10%. While, given
highly non-linear nature of the problem, it is not possible to associate individual parameters
in Table 9 with individual targets in Tables 10-12, Figures C1-C3 show that particular targets
play relatively more important roles in identifying certain parameters.
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Table 9: Parameter Values
(Calibrated)
Parameter Description
Ability Distribution
af = 0:72; af = 0:436; am = 0:361;  = 0:4
Preferences
 = 0:9961 Discount Factor
1 = 0:44, 2 = 0:36, 3 = 22:0, n = 2:20 Preferences for Children
 = 0:757 Preferences for Leisure
Cost of Children
d = 0:08 (4% of household inc) Childcare Cost
' = 0:22 Frac. of Household with Informal Care
 = 0:15 Time Cost of Babies
Female Wages
0 = 0:02, 1 =  0:0004 Human Capital Accumulation
0 = 0:95 Temporary Contract Wage Penalty
Labor Market
 = 0:765 Time Cost of Search
 = 0:05 Promotion Probability
 = 0:225; 25 = 0:6 Job Finding Rate
1 = 0:008; 0 = 0:055 Job Destruction Rate
 = 0:135 Time Cost of Split Jobs
 = 0:40 Frac. of Split-Schedule Jobs
Targets in Table 10 determine the parameters of the ability distribution and the para-
meters of female wage process. Mean female ability, af ; maps into gender wage gap (recall
that am = 1); while af and am into variances of male and female earnings. The corre-
lation between earnings of husbands and wives in the data (about 0.44) determines : The
parameters 0, 1; and 0 generate the observed age earnings proles for women with tem-
porary and permanent contracts (recall that female human capital accumulation is given by
ln(h0) = lnh + ln(1 + 1 + 2j); while female wages are determined as wf (a; h; P ) = Pah
with 0 < 1 = 1): Finally, in order to calibrate the discount factor, ;we target the ratio of
median wealth between ages 45-54 and 35-44.25
25In order to compute this ratio we use the 2014 wave of Bank of Spains Survey of Household Finances
(Encuesta Financiera de las Familias or the EFF). The EFF is a survey conducted by the Bank of Spain that
collects information on socio-economic characteristics, income, assets, and debt of around 6,000 households
in each wave. We restrict the sample to married couples in which the wive has at least a college degree.
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Table 10: The Model vs. Data Inequality
Model Data Source
Variance of Wife Log Earnings 0.16 0.21 Table A2
Variance of Husband Log Earnings 0.20 0.21 Table A2
Husband and Wife Earnings Correlation 0.43 0.44 Table A2
Female Wage Growth 2535 (permanent) Figure 9
Female Wage Growth 3552 (permanent) Figure 9
Temporary to Permanent Wage Ratio Figure 9
Hourly Wage Gender Gap 0.96 0.93 Table A2
Median Wealth 45-54/Median Wealth 35-44 2.22 2.30 The EFF
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
25 30 35 40 45
Perm Perm-data
Temp Temp-data
Figure 9. Age-Earnings Proles for Females (model vs. data)
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010.
Sample: Native, married women with at least a college education
born between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4.
The next set of targets pertains to labor market outcomes (Table 11). Again, mapping be-
tween some parameters and targets is straightforward. The parameter 25 (fraction of women
of age 25 who have an opportunity to work) is calibrated to match the fraction of age-25 un-
employed women. In the model economy, a fraction  of jobs have split-shift schedules and
they have a time cost of : These parameters help us to match fraction of standard contracts
among mothers and non-mothers. Other targets in Table 11, employment and unemployment
among women with or without children, determine the parameters such as the preferences
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for leisure (); goods and time cost of children (d and ); and the time cost of search ():
Finally, the fraction of females with a temporary contract and transitions from temporary
and permanent contracts to unemployment allow us to identify the promotion probability
(); and destruction rates for temporary (0) and permanent jobs (1): It is important to
note that while each temporary (or permanent) job has an exogenous destruction rate, the
transitions to unemployment depend both on whether a woman chooses to stay unemployed
or leaves the labor force upon the termination of her job, and on whether, independent of a
destruction shock, she chooses to move to unemployment or out-of-the-labor force.
Table 11: The Model vs. Data Labor Market
Model Data Source
Female Unemployment/Population 25 0.27 0.23 Table A1a
Female Unemployment/Population, Mothers, 2544 0.06 0.07 Table A1b
Female Unemployment/Population 2544 0.08 0.08 Table A1b
Fraction of Temporary Workers, Females 2544 0.26 0.25 Table A1b
Trans prob Temporary to Unemployment 3034 4.6 5.2 Table 2
Trans prob Permanent to Unemployment 3034 0.5 0.5 Table 2
Female Employment/Population, 25-44, Non-mothers 0.81 0.81 Table A1b
Female Employment/Population, 25-44, Mothers 0.75 0.76 Table A1b
Female Employment/Population, 25-44, Mothers with Babies 0.69 0.71 Table A1b
Fraction of Non-mothers on Standard Contracts 0.52 0.54 Section 2
Fraction of Mothers on Standard Contracts 0.70 0.71 Section 2
Finally, we also target the level and the timing of fertility (Table 12). These targets
determine parameters that govern how much households value children (1; 2; 3 and n):
In the model economy, a ' fraction of households have informal care and do not pay any
childcare costs. We choose this parameter to match the fraction of employed mothers with
babies (ages 0-2) that use informal care.
Table 12: The Model vs. Data Fertility
Model Data Source
Average Number of Children at 44, Not Employed 1.82 1.82 Table 1
Average Number of Children at 30, Employed 0.16 0.26 Table 1
Fraction of Childless Women at 44, Employed 0.15 0.18 Table A3
Fraction of Women with more than 2 Children at 44, Employed 0.59 0.57 Table A3
Informal Child Care Use, Mothers with Children age 0-2, Employed 0.30 0.31 Table A4
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Few parameters in Table 9 can be compared directly with their data counterparts. Our
calibrated value for d = 0:08 implies that households on average spend about 4% of their
income on childcare. For Spain, the OECD estimates that net childcare costs as a fraction of
household income was 4.7% in 2015, which is very close to our estimates.26 The calibrated
value of  = 0:135 implies that xed time cost of a split-shift job is about 2.2 hours more
per day (13.5% of 16 non-sleeping hours). This is close to 1.3 hours xed-cost for split-
shift contacts that we calculate from the Spanish time use data in Section 2. Finally, it is
important to comment on exp(j 3)
1+exp(j 3) term in the utility function. Given our estimated value
for 3; this term is equal to 0.95 for a 25-years old woman, i.e. for a 25 years old female the
weight on the utility from children is 0.951: The weight increases quickly to 1 for a 28
years old woman. Hence, this term simply helps us to push fertility away from very young
(25 to 28) ages.
5.1 Non-Targeted Moments
In order to assess the models ability to account for observed fertility and labor market
behavior in the data, in this section we present several non-targeted moments from the
model and their data counterparts. Figure 10 shows the fraction of women with a temporary
contract. Both in the model and in the data, most contracts start as temporary and the
fraction of women with a temporary contract declines smoothly as women age, although by
age 40 about 15% of women still work with a temporary contract.
26See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=NCC. The estimates refer to a household with 2
children in which the primary earners has 100% and the secondary earner has 67% of the mean wage in the
economy.
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Figure 10. Labor Market Outcomes for Females (model vs. data)
Source: The EPA, 1987-2010.
Sample: Native, married women with at least a college education, born between 1966 and 1971.
Tables 13 and 14 show the performance of model along several other dimensions that are not
directly targeted in the calibration. First, the model is able to replicate the fact that female
employment and household income levels are positively correlated (Table 13). Furthermore,
both in the model and the data, temporary contracts last about 2 years (the mean duration
is 7 quarters in the data and 9 quarters in the model). Since uncertainty in labor markets
generated by short durations of temporary jobs is a key factor for low fertility in the model,
it is reassuring that the model is able to generate reasonable durations of temporary jobs.
Table 13: Non-Targeted Moments Labor Markets
Model Data Source
Employment/Pop., Females, 25-44, hhold inc., 1st tercile 0.52 0.58 Table A5
Employment/Pop., Females, 25-44, hhold inc., 2nd tercile 0.91 0.83 Table A5
Employment/Pop., Females, 25-44, hhold inc., 3rd tercile 0.89 0.93 Table A5
Mean rm tenure, temporary (quarters) 9 7 The MCVL
In Table 14, we present several additional moments on fertility. The model is able to
generate the fact that completed (age 44) fertility is increasing in both female earnings and
total households income. On the other hand, the model is not able to generate the extent of
fertility delay for employed mothers. In the data an employed mother has only 0.98 children
at age 35, while such women has 1.3 children in the model. The model does an excellent job,
however, in capturing the e¤ects of temporary contract on fertility. First, both in the data
33
and in the model, a childless female who has a temporary contract at t   4 (four quarters
ago) has a much smaller chance of becoming a mother (3.2 versus 2 percent). Furthermore,
such short run e¤ects has a cumulative e¤ect along the life cycle. A female who spends more
than 50% of her working life with temporary contract has 1.24 children in the model, while
one who spends less than 50% of her working life has 1.5 children.
Table 14: Non-Targeted Moments Fertility
Model Data Source
Number of Children at 35, Employed 1.32 0.98 Table 1
Number of Children at 40, Employed 1.39 1.50 Table 1
Number of children at 44, Employed 1.44 1.51 Table 1
Number of children at 44, female earnings, 1st tercile 1.33 1.35 Table 1
Number of children at 44, female earnings, 2nd tercile 1.43 1.49 Table 1
Number of children at 44, female earnings, 3rd tercile 1.55 1.72 Table 1
Number of children at 44, hhold inc., 1st tercile 1.41 1.55 Table A6
Number of children at 44, hhold inc., 2nd tercile 1.47 1.56 Table A6
Number of children at 44, hhold inc., 3rd tercile 1.64 1.79 Table A6
Prob of transition maternity (permanent) 3.2 3.4 Table 4
Prob of transition maternity (temporary) 2.0 2.3 Table 4
Average number of children at 44
on temp. contracts, ages 25-44 < 50% 1.50 1.53 Table 6
on temp. contracts, ages 25-44  50% 1.24 1.27 Table 6
6 Understanding the Lowest Low Fertility
Why is the fertility rate so low in the benchmark economy? What role do labor market
uncertainty and inexibility play? In order to answer these questions, we consider three
counterfactual experiments. In the rst experiment, we eliminate jobs with split-shift sched-
ules and make them identical to jobs with regular schedules by setting  = 0: This saves
about two hours of xed-cost of work for women who were working with split-shift sched-
ules in the benchmark economy. In the second experiment, we lower the separation rate for
temporary contracts from 5.5% to 1.8% so that the mean duration of jobs with a temporary
contract increases from 9 quarters (little over 2 years) in the benchmark economy to 12
quarters (3 years) in the counterfactual economy. In the third experiment, we combine the
rst two experiments and eliminate both labor market inexibility associated with split-shift
schedules and reduce labor market uncertainty associated with temporary contracts. Table
15 shows the results.
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The rst experiment increases the completed fertility rate of employed mothers at age 44
substantially. While employed women at age 44 have about 1.44 children in the benchmark
economy, they have 1.75 children, about 0.3 children more, in a world without split-shift
contracts. In the second experiment, when we increase the duration of temporary jobs from
9 to 12 quarters, the fertility of employed mothers increases from 1.44 to 1.67, an increase
of about 0.2 children. The combined reform of eliminating split-shift and increasing the
duration of temporary contracts increases the completed fertility rate of employed mothers
to 1.87. Not surprisingly, the higher completed fertility comes with an earlier childbearing,
much smaller fraction of women who are childless, and an increase in the fraction of women
who have 2 or more children.
In each of these experiments, the completed fertility of mothers who are not employed also
increases, but the increase is much smaller. As a result, the fertility gap between employed
and non-employed mothers declines signicantly. In the benchmark economy, non-employed
mothers have about 0.4 more children more than employed mothers (1.82 vs. 1.44). The
gap is only 0.08 (1.87 vs. 1.95) children when we eliminate both split-shift jobs and make
temporary contracts last longer. In this experiment, the average TFR for college-educated
women, employed or unemployed at age 44, is 1.88.
In order to put these increases in the fertility in perspective, in the last three columns
of Table 15 we present three additional experiments. First, in column (iii), we completely
eliminate temporary contracts and assume that separation rates are the same for temporary
and permanent contracts and equal to the separation rate for permanent contracts in the
benchmark economy, i.e. 0 = 1 =  = 0:8%. This experiment makes jobs much more
stable. While such a radical change in the duration of jobs might be unrealistic, a comparison
between columns (ii) and (iii) shows that simply increasing the duration of temporary jobs
from 9 to 12 quarters goes a long way in increasing the fertility and generates about 84% of
the fertility increase that would occur by making all jobs last much longer quarters.
Second, in column (iv), we lower the childcare cost, d; by 25%. Among the OECD coun-
tries, Spain has one of the lowest net childcare expenditures as a fraction of total household
income, which reects the widespread use of informal childcare. The net childcare costs are
also low in Scandinavian countries, which, in contrast to Spain, reects government childcare
subsidies (in kind or cash). A 25% decline in childcare costs would lower the total spend-
ing on childcare to a level comparable to Sweden (from about 5% to 4% of total household
income). Lower childcare costs increase the completed fertility of employed mothers at age
44, but the e¤ect is not large (an increase from 1.44 to 1.59).27 A possible reason for this in
our framework might be the existence of frictions, which might limit how much fertility can
increase.
Finally, in column (v), we increase the promotion rates for females () so that the fraction
of females with a temporary contract is the same as the one for males. The e¤ect of this
27Bick (2016) also nds that reductions in childcare costs have a modest e¤ect on fertility.
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experiment on fertility is not signicant either; the completed fertility for employed women
increases from 1.44 to 1.54, an increase of about 0.1 children. The economy in this experiment
(v) has, by construction, as many women in permanent contracts as men (about 14%). The
temporary jobs are, however, still risky since they have a higher separation rate (remember
that 0 = 0.055 while 1 = 0:008 in the benchmark economy). As a result, many young
women still choose to wait to have a child after they settle on a permanent job.
What does it take for working women to have a larger number of children? The results in
Table 15 show that the answer is to make them enter the labor force. In all the experiments
in Table 15, columns (i), (ii) and (i)+(ii), higher fertility goes together with higher female
labor force participation and employment. The combined experiment of higher exibility
and lower uncertainty, column (i)+(ii), increases female labor force participation from 85%
to 95%. Indeed, due to the higher labor force participation of women, the measured unem-
ployment rate barely changes between these experiments. This experiment also eliminates
the employment gap between mothers and mothers with babies, and therefore reduces the
gender employment gap. As women enter the labor force they also stay away from split-
shift contracts. In the second experiment, the fraction of mothers with split-shift schedules
declines from 0.3 to 0.15.
Finally, experiments generate negligible e¤ects on the gender wage gap. Indeed, two
forces in the model work in opposite directions. On the one hand, due to learning by doing,
higher labor market attachment has a positive impact on female wages. On the other hand,
in the presence of positive self-selection of women into the labor market, an increase in female
employment depresses average female workersability. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) nd
that positive self-selection is essential to understand gender employment gaps and gender
wage gaps across countries.
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Table 15: The E¤ect of Higher Flexibility and Lower Uncertainty
BM (i) (ii) (i)+(ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Children at 35 (employed) 1.32 1.68 1.62 1.83 1.73 1.48 1.47
Children at 40 (employed) 1.39 1.73 1.65 1.87 1.80 1.55 1.51
Children at 44 (employed) 1.44 1.75 1.67 1.87 1.81 1.59 1.54
Children at 44 (non employed) 1.82 1.85 1.90 1.95 1.92 1.86 1.86
Children at age 44 1.52 1.76 1.71 1.88 1.83 1.64 1.60
Fraction childless 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12
Fraction with 2 kids 0.59 0.79 0.75 0.90 0.85 0.64 0.66
Unemployed/Population, 25-44 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.08
Employed/Population, 25-44 0.77 0.82 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.81
Out of Labor Force/Population, 25-44 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.11
Unemployment rate, 25-44 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.09
Emp./Population, 25-44, mothers 0.75 0.84 0.83 0.90 0.85 0.77 0.81
Emp./Population, 25-44, mothers 02 0.69 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.77 0.79
Split-shift sched., 25-44, Non-Mothers 0.48 - 0.36 - 0.29 0.47 0.53
Split-shift sched., 25-44, Mothers 0.30 - 0.12 - 0.03 0.32 0.14
Temporary workers, 2544 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.26 - 0.26 0.14
Gender Wage Gap 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.95
Gender Employment Gap 0.85 0.91 0.91 0.99 0.92 0.86 0.90
 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.12
 (time cost of split contract) 0.135 0 0.135 0 0.135 0.135 0.135
0 (job destruction, temporary) 0.055 0.055 0.018 0.018 0.008 0.055 0.055
1 (job destruction, permanent) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
d (childcare cots) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08
Note: (BM) Benchmark, (i) No split contract, (ii) Higher duration for temporary contract, (iii) No duality,
(iv) Lower childcare costs, (v) Higher promotion rate.
6.1 The Role of Temporary Contracts
Temporary contracts in the benchmark economy have a much higher separation rate than
the permanent ones. This labor market uncertainty makes women stay out of the labor force,
and even when they are in the labor force, they choose not to have children. In this section,
we try to understand the mechanisms driving the increase in the TFR after the elimination
of labor market duality.
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We consider a set of counterfactuals that can separate the role played by the increase in
participation that comes with the elimination of duality from the pure e¤ect of eliminating
duality. In Experiment (iii), the labor market is more attractive because the overall destruc-
tion rate in the economy is smaller than in the benchmark. Therefore, searching for a job
has a higher return for women. In Experiment (iii-nd) of Table 16, we replicate Experiment
(iii) from Table 15 but lower the job-nding rate so that the fraction of women who stay
out of the labor force is the same as in the benchmark economy. In such an economy, the
increase in fertility is much more muted (the TFR of working mother increase from 1.44 to
1.50). Long unemployment duration discourages women from entering the labor force and
makes fertility again a risky decision.
Next, we eliminate the dual labor market structure, i.e. set 0 = 1; but choose the
common job destruction rate so that the new economy has again the same fraction of women
who are out of the labor force (about 15%). Again, the e¤ect on fertility is much lower.
These experiments show that duality per se does not a¤ect the fertility decision of women.
What limits womens entry to the labor force and lowers fertility is the uncertainty that
the duality generates. According to our analysis, even in a single contract economy, a low
job-nding rate or a high job-destruction rate that keeps the participation at its benchmark
economy levels can result in low fertility.28
Finally, another aspect that we explore in this section is the interaction between the
degree of uncertainty in the economy and the prevalence of split-shift jobs. As shown in
Experiment (iii) in Table 15, when the overall destruction rate is smaller (and therefore jobs
are more stable), females stay away from jobs with split-shift schedules. This endogenous
decision may work as an amplication e¤ect of the elimination of duality on the TFR. The
reason is that split-shift jobs entail a higher cost of having children. To understand the
importance of this channel, we consider an economy in which temporary contracts have a
much lower separation rate as in Experiment (iii), but a higher fraction of jobs come in
split-shift schedules so that the fraction of mothers working with split-shift schedules is the
same as it is in the benchmark economy (about 30%). The last column of Table 16 illustrates
such an economy. The fertility rate of working mothers increases from 1.44 to 1.47. The
increase is again much smaller than the decline in column (iii). Hence, the ability of women
to choose to work with regular schedule contracts is a critical factor behind the positive e¤ect
28Our analysis abstracts from rms. Yet, one can imagine that rms can react to changes in labor market
regulation. In particular, if the government tries to increase the duration of temporary contracts or establish
a single one, rms can react, and the job nding and/or destruction rates in the economy may be a¤ected.
Hence, a possible way to read the results in Table 16 is such general equilibrium reactions can inuence how
the elimination of duality a¤ects fertility.
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of eliminating the duality of labor markets on fertility.
Table 16: Female Labor Force Participation and the Fertility
BM (iii) (iii-lower nd.) (iii-alter.) (iii-higher split)
Children at 35 (employed) 1.32 1.73 1.42 1.27 1.40
Children at 40 (employed) 1.39 1.80 1.47 1.37 1.45
Children at 44 (employed) 1.44 1.81 1.50 1.48 1.47
Children at 44 (non employed) 1.82 1.92 1.85 1.79 1.88
Children at age 44 1.52 1.83 1.57 1.54 1.54
Fraction childless 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.15 0.15
Fraction with 2 kids 0.59 0.85 0.65 0.62 0.62
Unemp./Population, 25-44 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07
Empl./Population, 25-44 0.85 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.89
Out of Labor F./Population, 25-44 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.11
Unemployment rate, 25-44 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
Split-shift sched., 25-44, Non-Mothers 0.48 0.26 0.52 0.48 0.61
Split-shift sched., 25-44, Mothers 0.30 0.03 0.29 0.27 0.30
Temporary workers, 2544 0.26 - - - -
 0.225 0.225 0.125 0.225 0.225
0 0.055 0.008 0.008 0.019 0.008
1 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.019 0.008
 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.55
Note: (iii) No duality, (iii-lower nding) iii with a lower job nding rate, (iii-alternative) no duality but higher job
destruction rate, (iii-split) iii with a higher share of split-shift jobs.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we study how labor market frictions a¤ect fertility decisions. In many Eu-
ropean countries, there is a divide between temporary jobs that have low ring costs and
permanent ones that have high ring costs. Young workers start their careers with tempo-
rary jobs, and only after moving between di¤erent temporary jobs they land in a permanent
one. For women, this implies a race between the biological clock and job security. If they
wait, they can build their human capital and have a stable job. If they dont, they risk
having children with short-lasting jobs that often come with unemployment spells between
them. Many women choose to wait, which increases the age at rst marriage and decreases
completed fertility. It is even more di¢ cult for women who work in inexible jobs that
require long and particular hours.
We build and estimate a model of fertility and labor market choices of women to under-
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stand these trade-o¤s. We then ask whether women would choose to have more children in a
world with lower uncertainty and inexibility. We focus on college-educated women in Spain,
a country with a very low fertility rate, especially among college-educated women. Spain
has the highest fraction of workers with temporary contracts in Europe. It also provides us
with a concrete example of inexible working arrangements for women: split-shift schedules
that involve long lunch breaks and very late ending times.
Our results show that labor market reforms that reduce labor market uncertainty and
inexibility have a signicant positive e¤ect on fertility. These reforms enable women to
have their children early, reduce the fraction of women who are childless, and increase sub-
stantially those who have two or more children. They also eliminate the employment gender
gap. Indeed, higher fertility in the counterfactual worlds with lower uncertainty and higher
exibility goes together with an increase in labor force participation and employment of
mothers.
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Appendix A: Data
Spanish Social Security Records Our main data source is the 2005-2010 Continuous
Sample of Working Lives (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales con Datos Fiscales, MCVL).
The MCVL is a random sample of 4% of the population of the individuals registered to the
Spanish Social Security during the reference year.29 Individuals without a relationship with
the social security system at any time during the reference year are not included in that
particular MCVL edition. Starting from the reference year and going back, the MCVL
records all changes about the labor market history of individuals up to the date of rst
employment (or up to 1980 for older cohorts). In a given year, a working age person, can
have a social security record if he is employed or is receiving unemployment benets.
The unit of observation in the MCVL is an individual labor market spell, which can be
employment with a particular contract (a job spell) or unemployment (an unemployment
spell).30 Each spell is characterized by a start date, and date and a rm identier. For each
job spell of an employee, the MCVL provides information on part-time or full-time status,
sector of employment (public or private), industry at the NACE three-digit level, occupation,
type of contract (temporary or permanent), and working hours expressed as a percentage of
a full-time equivalent job.31 The MCVL also contains monthly social security contributions
at individual-establishment level and the days worked in a particular month. Although the
social security contributions are both top and bottom coded, this information allows us to
calculate censored earnings for each job that an individual holds in a month.32
The MCVL also provides information on important individual characteristics contained
in social security records, such as age and gender but lacks information on other key demo-
graphic characteristics such as education or marital status. However, it can be matched with
the Continuous Municipal Registry (Padrón Continuo, hereinafter Padrón), which contains
information on the country of birth, nationality, and educational attainment and with the
Spanish Municipal Registry of Inhabitants (Padrón Municipal de Habitantes), which con-
tains information on the household composition (date of birth and the sex of each individual
living in the household at the time of interview). These registries allow us to construct vari-
29The MCVL does not cover public sector employees who belong to a di¤erent social assistance system,
e.g. armed forces and judicial power.
30The MCVL also includes information on self-employed. Since our focus on wage and salary earners, we
exclude from the sample all individuals enrolled in the self-employment regime.
31Part-time/full-time status can be constructed using the working hours expressed as a percentage of a
full-time equivalent job. Employers assign workers into one of ten social security occupation categories to
proxy the skills required by the job. Information on contractual conditions for workers were required to be
provided by the employer since 1996.
32In addition to censored earnings, earnings information is also available from income tax records for any
job that was held between 2005 and 2010. However, as described later in more detail, we restrict the sample
to women born between 1966-1971. As a result, uncensored earnings are available only after women in our
sample (1966-1971 born) are 35-44 years old, thus we use censored earnings in our analysis.
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ables, such as marital status, the number of children and new births. We consider a woman
married if there is a male household member in the household whose age di¤erence with her
is between -2 and +10 years.33 We determine mothers based on the presence of household
members aged 0-16 year old. As we determine marital and motherhood status of a woman
based on her household members and their dates of birth, there is a possibility that a woman
and a male/child can live in the same household but they are not spouses/parent and child.
To minimize this probability, we drop from the sample women who are living in households
with more than one potential husband or with another potential mother.34
Based on labor market spells, we construct a quarterly panel data set on labor market
transitions of women in the MCVL. We start to construct the quarterly panel using the
individuals that were registered to social security in 2010. For these individuals we record
the complete labor market history contained in this edition going back to their date of
rst employment (or to 1980 for the older cohorts) and use municipality records for their
personal characteristics. For individuals who are not included in 2010, but appear in previous
editions, we follow the same procedure. The resulting data set contains information for each
individual in each quarter on type of employment contract, sector of employment, industry,
occupation, earnings, country of birth, nationality, education, marital status, number of
children and new-born children.
For individuals that only have a unique spell in a quarter, i.e. they hold a single job or
they are unemployment during an entire quarter, this procedure is rather straightforward. If
an individual changes job within a rm in a quarter, we combine the consecutive employment
spells into a single job spell for the purposes of constructing rm tenure, but otherwise treat
them as separate spells with di¤erent job characteristics. There can also be individuals who
hold multiple job at the same time or change jobs during the quarter. For such cases, we
follow De la Roca and Puga (2017) to assign a main job. If an individual had more than one
spell with the same rm in a given quarter (around 10% in each birth year cohort): we keep
the one with longest duration (in days) in that quarter. If the duration in quarter is the
same (only handful - less than 1% in each birth year-cohort), we keep the one with the total
(not in that quarter) longest duration (in days). If the total duration is also the same (only
handful - less than 0.5% in each birth year-cohort), we keep the latest one (most of them
are on day contracts). At this stage, individuals may have more than one spell by quarter if
they worked in more than one rm (or spent some time unemployed). For those who have
more than one spell in a quarter (in multiple rms), the main job is the one that has the
highest social security contributions in that quarter.35 For individuals who hold at least one
33In the EPA, for around 94% of women in our sample, age gap between them and their husbands is
between -2 and 10, with a median age di¤erence of 2.
34Any other male household member in the household whose age di¤erence with her is between -2 and
+10 years is considered as another potential husband. Similarly, any other 1966-1971 born women living in
the same household can be another potential mother.
35Fernandez-Kranz and Lacuesta (2009) also use MCVL data and determine the main job of an individual.
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job and but also experience spell (or spells) of unemployment in a quarter, we assign a main
job, independent of the duration of unemployment spell, following the same criteria.
After determining the main job for each worker in each quarter, we express the quarterly
earnings for the main job in 2000 Euros using quarterly consumer price index. Then, we
compute the daily earnings from the main job by dividing the quarterly real earnings by the
days worked in that quarter in that job.36 Finally, we adjust the real daily earnings from
the main job by part-time work and calculate the full-time equivalent real daily earnings in
euros for each quarter.37
We restrict the analysis to native, married women with at least a college education who
were born between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4. Among native, married women who were born
between 1966Q1 and 1971Q4, 18% are college educated.38 ;39 When we look at male earnings,
we focus on men born between 1964Q1 and 1969Q4 since the median age di¤erence between
husbands and wives is about 2 years for this sample of women in the EPA sample (see below).
We consider a man married if there is a female household member in the household who is
22 years old or older and whose age di¤erence with him is between -10 and +2 years. We
implement the former restriction to ensure that we do not consider a man married if the
female household member has the age di¤erence with him is between -10 and +2 years but
she is still too young to be his spouse, or married. Finally, again we drop from the sample
men who are living in households with more than one potential wife or those who have
another man from the same cohort living in the household.
Since the type of contract is a key variable in our analysis and since the MCVL provides
reliable information on the type of contract only after 1996, we restrict our sample to job
spells from 1996 to 2010. We construct labor market experience and tenure variables, how-
ever, using all available information back to 1980. We drop workers who worked less than
30 full-time equivalent days in any year. In the sample, there are temporary contracts that
continue beyond the legal limit of 3 years (7% of the total temporary spells in our sample).
Following Guell and Petrongolo (2007), we censor all temporary durations longer than 14
quarters at 14 quarters.
However, their main job denition is di¤erent than ours, that is, if an individual has multiple jobs in a given
year, the main job is the one under a permanent contract. In the case of multiple jobs with the same type
of contract, the main job is the one that the individual worked the largest number of days.
36The MCVL data do not contain information on hours worked to construct hourly wages.
37The MCVL provides information on a part-time coe¢ cient which identies the working hours of a part-
time worker in a company in proportion to the duration of normal working hours of a full-time worker in
the same company. This allows us to build a measure of full-time equivalent (FTE) earnings that is what
part-time workers could be expected to earn if they worked full-time.
38In the MCVL, we distinguish between natives and immigrants according to the country of birth and
nationality.
39In our sample, women are 25 to 31 years old in 1996 and 39 to 45 years old in 2010. By this way, we
ensure that childless women in our sample are unlikely to be mothers after 2010.
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Spanish Labor Force Survey As a rich administrative data source, the MCVL pro-
vides an excellent picture of the Spanish labor market dynamics. The MCVL does not
contain, however, any information on individuals who are out of the labor force. To be able
to calculate distribution of workers across di¤erent labor market states (employment, un-
employment and out-of-the-labor force), we use data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey
(Encuesta de Población Activa, EPA) from 1987 to 2010.40 These surveys are run by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), the Spanish Statistical Agency, and constitute the
Spanish part of Labor Force Statistics of the OECD. Each survey consists of a representa-
tive sample of about 60,000 households and provides detailed labor market information of
all individuals who are older than 16 in each household. When we calculate EPA statistics,
we restrict the sample to heads of households and their partners or spouses, and, following
the same restriction as in the MCVL sample, focus on married native women with college
education or more born between 1966 and 1971 and husbands. However, when we look at
labor market outcomes for males, we consider all men (not only husbands of high educated
women) as in the MCVL where we cannot implement restriction on husbands education
level.
Since the second quarter of 1987, the EPA has also a rotating panel dimension (called
EPA-ujos or EPA-ows) that follows individuals up to six consecutive quarters. This al-
lows us to calculate quarterly transition rates across labor market states. We calculate the
transition rates across di¤erent labor market states using 1995, 2000 and 2005 waves of EPA-
ows. Since in EPA-ows the age information is available only in 5-year intervals, we have
to base the analysis on the 1966-1970 cohort of married women instead of the 1966-1971
cohort that we used in the MCVL.41 EPA-ows do not allow us to link husbands and wives.
As a result, since the median age di¤erence between husbands and wives is about 2 years for
this cohort in the EPA sample, for men we restrict the sample the 1966-1971 cohort married
men. Finally, since in EPA-ows we do not have information on nationality, we consider all
women instead of only native women.
European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) Nei-
ther the MCVL nor the EPA allow us to construct a measure of total household earnings.
We construct household level income variables using the European Union Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) from 2004 to 2012. We restrict the sample to heads
of households and their spouses, and again focus on married native women with at least a
college education born between 1966 and 1971 and their husbands. To calculate earning sta-
tistics, we also restrict sample to employees with non-missing wage and hours information.
40Since the particular cohort we are focusing is between 25-44 only in years 1991-2010, we are e¤ectivity
using data from the EPA from 1991 to 2010.
41The age is reported in 5 year intervals in EPA-ows, from 16-19 to 60 64, and one age group for those
who are older than 65. Consider 2005 EPA-ows, the 1966-1971 cohort were 34-39 years then. But the only
category that overlaps with this groups is 35-39 which correspond to 1966-1970.
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We also exploit the information on childcare arrangements that is available in the EU-SILC.
For each child under age 12, the EU-SILC reports the number of hours of di¤erent forms
of childcare, such as center-based care, baby-sitters or relatives, that a household uses. To
calculate childcare statistics, we also restrict sample to those who reported positive hours
of education or childcare use in any of the childcare arrangement categories for at least one
0-12 years old child.42
Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS) Finally, we calculate the fraction of mother and
non-mother working with a split-shift contract from the Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS)
for 2009-2010. We restrict the sample to wage earners and to 25-44 years old native married
women with at least a college education. Mothers are identied from the household roster.
If any of the household member of a respondent is identied as son/daughter, or if the
respondent herself is identied by the STUS as having children under 18 who live with the
respondent, we consider them as mothers. The split vs. regular work schedule is a question
in the STUS, so the fraction of mothers and non-mothers who work with a split contract is
simply the fraction of those who answer that their work schedule is a split one.
Appendix B: Additional Tables for Targets
Table A1a. Distribution across Labor Market States at age 25
Out of Labor Force Unemployed Temp. Perm.
Married Women (%) 21.34 22.78 27.12 28.75
Low educated High educated
Non-employed Temp. Perm. Non-employed Temp. Perm.
Married Men (%) 12.05 24.43 63.52 4.29 26.99 68.71
Source: The EPA, 1987-2010. Sample: 23-27 years old married native women with at least a college education
born between 1966 and 1971 and their husbands (only household heads and spouses).
Table A1b. Distribution across Labor Market States by Motherhood Status, ages 25-44 (%)
Out of Labor Force Unemp. Temp. Perm.
All 15.28 7.68 19.34 57.70
Non-mothers 7.74 11.37 26.36 54.52
Mothers 17.62 6.54 17.16 58.68
Mothers of 0-2 years old 21.84 6.70 16.84 54.62
Source: The EPA, 1987-2010. Sample: 25-44 years old married native women with at least a college education
born between 1966 and 1971 (only household heads and spouses).
42The information on the number of hours in childcare in the EU-SILC is collected only from household
members not over 12 years old.
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Table A2. Inequality
All
Average hourly wage of wives 12.97
Average hourly wage of husbands 13.89
Variance of wiveslog(hourly wage) 0.207
Variance of husbandslog(hourly wage) 0.214
Correlation between husbandsand wiveslog(hourly wage) 0.438
Source: The EU-SILC, 2004-2012. Sample: 25-44 years old married native women with at least a college
education born between 1966 and 1971 and their husbands (only household heads and their spouses).
Sample is restricted to employees with non-missing wage and hours information.
Table A3. Distribution of Women across Parities, Employed (%)
Childless One child Two children Three (or more)
married at age 30 78.58 17.38 3.73 0.31
married at age 35 36.65 33.15 26.53 3.67
married at age 40 20.11 23.59 45.18 11.12
married at age 44 17.54 25.40 47.38 9.68
Source: The MCVL, 2005-2010. Sample: Native, married women with at least a college education born between
1966Q1 and 1971Q4.
Table A4. Distribution of Households by the Main Mode of Childcare Arrangement (%)
Children, 0-2
Education at pre-school 51.07
Childcare at a day-care centre 2.67
Childcare by a professional childcare provider 15.51
Childcare by grandparents/relatives/friends 30.75
Source: The EU-SILC ,2004-2012. Sample: 25-44 years old married native women with at least a college education
born between 1966 and 1971 and their husbands (only household heads and their spouses).
The sample is restricted to households who have at least one 0-2years old child and reported positive
hours of education or childcare use in any of the above categories for a 0-2 years old child.
Note: The number of hours in education and childcare during a usual week is collected for
household members not over 12 years old (age at the date of interview).
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Table A5. Employment Rate of Women by Household Gross Income Tercile
Tercile Employment/Population Household income (Euros)
1 0.58 23,595.6
2 0.83 44,342.32
3 0.93 76,336.9
Source: The EU-SILC, 2004-2012. Sample: 25-44 years old married native women
with at least a college education born between 1966 and 1971 (only household heads and spouses).
Table A6. Number of Children at age 44 by Household Gross Income Tercile
Tercile Number of Children Household income (Euros)
1 1.55 23,557.02
2 1.56 46,121.04
3 1.79 78,958.73
Source: The EU-SILC, 2004-2012. Sample: 40-44 years old married native women with at least a college education
born between 1966 and 1971 (only household heads and spouses).
Appendix C: Identication
In this section of the Appendix, we show how each target in Tables 10, 11 and 12 changes
when we increase each parameter in Table 9 by 10%. Figures C1, C2 and C3 correspond to
targets in Tables 10, 11, and 12, respectively. In each gure, a darker area for a parameter-
target pair suggests that the target plays a relatively important role for the identication of
that parameter.
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Figure C1: Sensitivity of Moments to Paramaters (Inequality)
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Figure C2: Sensitivity of Moments to Paramaters (Labor Market)
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Figure C3: Sensitivity of Moments to Paramaters (Fertility)
